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PENGARUH KUALITI PENDAPATAN DALAM MEMBUAT KEPUTUSAN 
INSTITUSI PELABURAN TERHADAP PERNIAGAAN MILIK FAMILI DI 
INDONESIA  
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Ramai pelabur menganggap pendapatan adalah kriteria terpenting dalam menilai 
sesuatu saham. Walau bagaimanapun, bagi memenuhi jangkaan pendapatan pelabur, 
pengurus boleh memanipulasi pendapatan dengan menggunakan kaedah perakaunan 
tertentu yang dilaporkan tanpa melanggar Prinsip Perakaunan yang di terima Umum 
(GAAP). Bagi mengelak pelabur dari tingkah laku oportunis pengurus firma, pelabur 
boleh bergantung kepada kualiti pendapatan. Kualiti pendapatan yang tinggi merupakan 
asas operasi firma itu sendiri. Kedua-dua ciri utama kualiti pendapatan yang lebih tinggi 
adalah berkait rapat dan kebolehpercayaan. Kajian ini dijalankan untuk mengkaji 
hubungan di antara kualiti pendapatan dengan keputusan pelabur untuk membeli dan 
menjual saham syarikat yang dimiliki oleh famili  di Indonesia. Kaedah Regrasi 
Logistik digunakan untuk menganilisis hubungan diantara kedua-kedua pembolehubah 
tersebut. Analisis kajian ini berdasarkan kepada sampel pada tahun 2000 hingga tahun 
2009 yang meliputi 1,450 firma tahun pemerhatian untuk menilai kualiti pendapatan 
manakala sampel pada tahun 2007 hingga tahun 2010 yang meliputi 50,688 firma tahun 
pemerhatian untuk membuat keputusan pelabur. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahawa 
terdapat hubungan yang signifikan di antara kualiti laba yang di percayai dengan 
keputusan pelabur untuk membeli dan menjual saham syarikat yang dimiliki oleh famili 
di Indonesia. Kajian ini gagal membuktikan hubungan di antara keputusan pelabur 
xix 
 
untuk membeli dan menjual saham dengan kualiti pendapatan tersebut. Kualiti 
pendapatan dipercayai dapat mengurangkan ralat pengukuran dengan magnitude ralat 
yang dianggarkan dengan akruan. Kualiti pendapatan yang berkaitan adalah bukan 
penentu keputusan pelabur kerana pengurangan semasa untuk meramalkan aliran tunai. 
Ini disebabkan oleh turun naik akruan.  Secara keseluruhannya, kualiti pendapatan 
dipercayai lebih penting daripada kualiti pendapatan berkaitan untuk pelabur dalam 
membuat keputusan kerana matlamat pelabur adalah untuk memaksimumkan pulangan 
di luar jangkaan mereka di mana dapat mengurangkan risiko yang berkaitan. Walau 
bagaimanapun, nilai penentu pekali di selaraskan bagi model keputusan pembelian dan 
penjualan saham adalah rendah (antara 12.7 peratus dan 13.6 peratus). Oleh itu, untuk 
menganalisis tingkah laku pelabur dalam membuat keputusan, kajian ini perlu 
dibangunkan dengan pembolehubah pada spektrum yang lebih luas dari kualiti 
pendapatan seperti maklumat bukan kewangan, keuntungan modal jangka pendek dan 
kecenderungan untuk menjadi spekulasi atau tidak rasional bagi acara yang luar biasa. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF EARNINGS QUALITY IN INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORTORS’ DECISION MAKING IN INDONESIA FAMILY OWNED 
BUSINESS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Earnings are considered by many investors to be the important criteria to assess 
the stock. However, to meet investors' earnings expectations manager could 
manipulate reported earnings by using specific accounting methods without violating 
Generally AcceptedAccounting Principles (GAAP). To avoid investors from the 
opportunistic behavior of firms’ managers, Investors can rely on earnings quality. 
Higher earnings quality represents the operating fundamentals of the firm.  The two 
primary characteristics of higher earnings quality are relevance and reliability. This 
study examines the relationship between earnings quality and investors' decision of 
buying and selling Indonesian family firms' stock. Logistic regression was used to 
analyze the relationship.  The analysis of this study is based on a sample from 2000 to 
2009 which covers 1450 firm-years observations for earnings quality value and sample 
from 2007–2010 which covers 50,688 observations for investors’ decision making. The 
result  shows that there is a significant relationship between reliable earnings quality 
and investors’ decision to buy and sell family firms’ stock. This study failed to prove 
the relationship between the investor's decision to buy or sell stock and relevant 
earnings quality. Reliable earnings quality assists investors’ decision making because 
reliable earnings quality emphasizes reducing measurement error by the magnitude of 
estimation error in accrual. Relevant earnings quality is not a determinant of investors’ 
xxi 
 
decision because those current earnings understate to predict cash flow. This is due to 
the accrual volatility. Overall,  it is concluded that reliable eranings quality is more 
important than relevant earnings quality for investors in decision-making, because the 
goal of investors is to maximize their expected return due to reducing its related risks. 
However, the adjusted coefficient determination of of buy decision model and sell 
decision model are very low (between 12.7 and 13.6 percent). Therefore,  further 
research on  behavior of investors’ decision-making should be developed with a 
variable on a broader spectrum of earnings quality such as non-financial information, 
short term capital gains and tend to be speculative or irrational for unusual events. 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Preamble 
 
In recent years, the prevalence of investing in the stock markets increased around the 
world (Markku, 2006). This also happened in Indonesia, where the tendency to invest is 
increasing. According to the Asian Development Bank (2009), in 2007, the Indonesian 
market capitalization increased by 59.18 percent to Rupiah (Rp) 1,988.33 trillion (USD 
207,767 million) which equalled to 49.01 percent of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). At the end of 2008, the stock market capitalization declined by almost half, at 
Rp 1,076 trillion (USD $ 112,435 million) which equalled to 19.34 percent of the GDP, 
because of the global financial crisis. In 2009, the stock market capitalization increased 
to Rp 1,847.63 trillion (USD 178,190 million), which equalled to 32.98 percent of the 
GDP. 
 
The finance theory suggests that investors used expected future cash flows to value 
stocks. Investors often relied on reported earnings to help them to estimate future cash 
flows (Salavei, 2009).  As a result, investors devoted a great deal of attention to firms’ 
reported earnings. News that a firm has fallen short of earnings expectations could 
immediately send its stock price plummeting. Firms that beat expectations, on the other 
hand, were handsomely rewarded by investors (Chan, 2001).  
 
2 
 
Nevertheless, managers could mislead investors about the underlying strength of the 
firms. As a primary motive, a firm’s manager has to manipulate reported earnings to 
influence investors’ perceptions of the firm’s value (Fischer and Stocken, 2004). 
Generally, there have been growing concern about firms’ earnings quality or the extent 
to which reported earnings reflect operating fundamentals. From investors’ perspective, 
low quality earnings indicate a defective resource allocation signal. In other words, low 
quality earnings are inefficient because they reduce economic growth by causing capital 
to be misallocated (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). 
 
Dechow, Ge, and Schrand (2010) defined higher earnings quality as earnings that 
provide more information about features of a firm’s performance relevant to a specific 
decision made by a specific decision maker.  There are three features in this definition. 
Firstly, earnings quality is conditional on the decision relevance of information. 
Secondly, the quality of reported earnings number depends on whether it is informative 
about the firm’s financial performance, many aspects of which are unobservable. 
Thirdly, earnings quality is jointly determined by the relevance of the firms’ underlying 
performance to the decision and by the ability of the accounting system to measure 
performance.  
 
Barua (2006) used qualitative characteristics, relevance and reliability, of financial 
statement information specified in the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts 
(SFAC) No. 2 (Financial Accounting Standard Board, (FASB) 1980) to measure the 
quality of earnings.  
3 
 
 
Relevance is related to the metric timeliness and has predictive power. In order to be 
relevant, the information must be timely and must have predictive value or feedback 
value or both. According to Basu (1997) timeliness reflects the ability of accounting 
earnings to differentially reflect economic losses (measured as negative stock returns) 
and economic gains (measured as positive stock returns). The predictive value of 
earnings is motivated by the assumption that more persistent earnings will yield better 
inputs to equity valuation models (Dechow et al., 2010). 
 
Meanwhile, reliability constitutes a metric that is verifiable, free from error or bias and 
accurately represents the transaction. To be reliable, information must have 
representational faithfulness and be neutral. Neutrality is the absence in reported 
information of bias intended to attain a predetermined result or to induce a particular 
mode of behavior. Earnings can reflect neutrality if managers faithfully report earnings, 
then the earnings number would be devoid of bias (Velury and Jenkins, 2006). 
Representational faithfulness is the correspondence or agreement between a measure or 
description and the phenomenon that it purports to represent. According to Ball and 
Brown (1968), earnings are a summary of events that affect the firm over the fiscal 
period during which the report is prepared. Similarly, returns capture financial market 
changes in firm value during that same period. Representational faithfulness of earnings 
numbers can be examined by examining the association between earnings and stock 
market returns (Velury and Jenkins, 2006). 
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Capital markets developed rules, regulations and additional mechanisms to ensure 
protection for capital providers, such as financial institutions, investors and 
stockholders, considered as corporate governance systems (Hart, 1995). Corporate 
governance deals with the mechanisms that ensure that investors in corporations get a 
return on their investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Bushman, Qi, Engel, and Smith 
(2004) defined corporate governance as a set of internal and external mechanisms to 
avoid stockholders’ expropriation by managers, to improve earnings quality and to 
protect the returns of capital borrowed by lenders. Thus, corporate governance has the 
capacity to improve the reliability of accounting earnings, increases the informativeness 
of accounting earnings and therefore improves capital market efficiency (Ewert and 
Wagenhofer, 2010).  
 
In Indonesia, The National Committee on Corporate Governance (NCCG) which was 
established by Decree of the Coordinating Minister for Economy, Finance and Industry 
Number: KEP/31/M.EKUIN/08/1999, issued the first Code of Good Corporate 
Governance in 1999.  The Code was revised several times the latest being the 2006 
Code revision of the previous Code of 2001. The purpose of this Code is to maximize 
corporate and stockholders value by enhancing transparency, responsibility, fairness in 
order to strengthen the firm’s competitive position both domestically and internationally 
as well as to create a sound environment to support investment. 
 
In 2010, a survey of corporate governance standards conducted by Gill, Allen, and 
Powell stated that Indonesia was ranked 10 out of 11 countries with a score of 40 which 
5 
 
was considered low level of corporate governance standard. In the first rank was 
Singapore followed by Hong Kong and Japan which received 67, 65, 57 scores 
respectively. Unfortunately, Indonesia’s score reflected that there was little progress in 
the movement of corporate governance in the country which did not bring a significant 
alteration for Indonesian firms. 
 
Lower levels of corporate governance reduce investors’ perception of the reliability of a 
firm’s performance, as measured by earnings. Therefore, in Indonesia, information 
regarding earnings quality is very important for investors to make decisions, because a 
majority of publicly listed companies in Indonesian capital market suffer from lower 
level of corporate governance. Lower level corporate governance could cause the lack 
of its level of information disclosure, asymmetric information, control problems and the 
expropriation of minority stockholders (Grishchenko, Litov, and Mei, 2006). The World 
Bank (2004) stated that Indonesia's business culture is based on relationships rather than 
rules, largely due to high incidence of concentrated ownership, family-owned 
businesses and controlling stockholders. 
 
 
1.2 Background of Studies 
 
According to Claessens and Fan (2002), there is extensive family control in more than 
half of East Asian firms, such as those in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan.  Firms in Indonesia have the same 
pattern with firms in Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, where many large 
6 
 
firms are controlled by families. On the other hand, in Japan, Hong Kong, Korea and 
Taiwan, there exists family control in many small firms. Indonesia stands out with the 
largest number of firms controlled by a single family; of more than four in average. 
Japan has the fewest, with each family controlling approximately one firm only.  
 
At one extreme, 16.6 percent and 17.1 percent of the total value of listed firms’ assets in 
Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively, can be traced to the ultimate control of a 
single family. The largest ten families in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand control 
half of the firms’ assets, while the largest ten families in Hong Kong and Korea control 
about a third of the corporate sector. The exception is Japan, where family control is 
insignificant. Across the nine East Asian countries, Japan has ownership by financial 
institutions of 38.5 percent while another 41.9 percent of corporations are widely held. 
At the other extreme, Indonesia has more than two-thirds (67.1 percent) of its publicly 
listed firms in family hands and only 0.6 percent are widely held 
1
.  
 
In 2013, the majority firms in Indonesia still are family firms (65.35 percent) followed 
by foreign ownership firms (19.80 percent) and State Owned Enterprise (11.8 percent). 
Widely held firms and financial institution controlled firms are less common, with 1.98 
and 0.99 percent of Indonesian firms respectively (Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013). 
 
According to Tabalujan (2002), in the Indonesian corporate context, family is 
important. Studies by Zhuang (2000) and Fitzpatrick (2000) revealed that a large 
                                                 
1
firm held is widely if there is no controlling blockholder who owns more than 20% of the votes (La Porta 
et al., 1999) 
7 
 
proportion of aggregate Indonesian economic activities revolved around firms 
controlled by a small group of wealthy and powerful families. The values and culture of 
these families, therefore, presumably affect how their firms are run and indirectly, how 
Indonesian firms are run. 
 
Based on the Indonesian Stock Exchange Report (2010), these family firms are included 
in the group of LQ 45. The LQ 45 index (Indonesian Stock Exchange) consists of 45 
firms that fulfil certain criteria, which are being included in the top 60 firms with the 
highest transaction value in the regular market in the last 12 months; have been listed in 
the Indonesian Stock Exchange for at least 3 months; have good financial conditions; 
prospects of growth and high transaction value frequency. 
 
In contrast to other types of ownership, family firms could affect the supply of quality 
financial reporting in one of two competing ways: the alignment effect and the 
entrenchment effect (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Wang, 
2006).   According to Wang (2006), the alignment effect occurs because families’ firms 
have incentive to produce higher quality earnings. The alignment effect implies that 
controlling stockholders are less likely to engage in opportunistic behavior in reporting 
accounting earnings in order to avoid potential damage to the family’s reputation, 
wealth and long term firm performance.  
 
Wang (2006) stated that the entrenchment effect views that corporate governance of 
family firms might be poor because important positions on both the management team 
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and the board are held by family members. As a result, monitoring by the board may be 
ineffective. Concentrated ownership enables controlling stockholders to determine how 
profits are distributed among stockholders and motivates controlling stockholders to 
expropriate wealth from other stockholders that lead to greater information asymmetry 
between controlling stockholders and minority stockholders. Information asymmetry 
decreases the transparency of accounting disclosures. As a result, family members have 
the opportunity to manipulate accounting earnings. Therefore, the entrenchment effect 
causes lower quality earnings. 
 
Earnings quality is important to evaluate an entity's financial health. According to 
Bellovary (2005), earnings quality reflects the firm's true earnings, as well as the 
usefulness of reported earnings to predict future earnings. To measure earnings quality, 
qualitative characteristics of financial statement information is used. This characteristic 
is specified in the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 2 (FASB 
1980) which stated that relevance and reliability are the two primary qualities that make 
accounting information useful for decision-making.  
 
Relevant earnings quality assists investors in making decisions to buy and sell stock. 
The firm that has a commitment of timely reporting of low realizations leads to full 
disclosure of information which reduces the uncertainties about expected future cash 
flows (Sujis, 2008). 
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Reliable earnings quality emphasizes on reducing measurement error caused by 
discretionary accruals, so that investors find these earnings useful and reflect the 
information contained in returns. If managers use their discretion to opportunistically 
manipulate accruals, earnings will become a low earnings quality. Earnings then 
become less reliable to measure the firm’s performance. Therefore, stock prices or 
returns do not fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings 
(Dechow, 1994). Lev (2002) argued that the stocks of firms with low quality of earnings 
appeared to be properly priced, as evidenced by the absence of subsequent abnormal 
returns, while the stocks of firms with a high quality of earnings were systematically 
undervalued, as evidenced by the existence of positive abnormal returns. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
Financial reporting should be able to present useful information to help investors to 
make decisions. Usefulness to decision-making is by providing the information that 
users need.  The quality of financial report is determined by its ability to capture the 
information of future prospects based on current information (Wahlen, Stickney, 
Baginski and Bradshaw, 2006). The accounting earnings is the most important element 
because of its ability to forecast the company’s future cash flows. The key to insurance 
of the company’s future cash flows is higher quality of earnings (Mulford and Yom, 
2012). 
 
However, in Indonesia, the capability of financial reporting to provide sufficient and 
appropriate information to help users to make decisions is questionable.  In Indonesia, 
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pressure for improvement of financial reporting practice grows in the wake of a series 
of financial reporting scandals. These scandals show the companies’ failure in providing 
accurate information for investors. That made investors wonder about the quality of 
corporate financial reports, especially the quality of earnings (Chariri, 2009). 
 
One of the scandals involved a family firm, Barito Pacific Timber, which decided to go 
public in 1993. Barito’s float was dogged by widespread concerns about the firm's 
entrenchment effect (Rosser, 1999).  The entrenchment effect was based on the 
argument that concentrated ownership enabled controlling stockholders to maximise 
their private benefits, at the expense of other shareholders. The firm maintained the 
funds and channelled them to other firms within the same group. This expropriation is 
called tunnelling (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2009).  
 
Barito injected funds in the form of loans into Chandra Asri, a dubious petrochemical 
joint venture owned by Barito’s boss, Prajogo Pangestu. This tunnelling took the form 
of expropriation of cash flows that lowered the quality of earnings. The tunnelling 
process has implications for the earnings statement and it could significantly affect a 
firm’s long-term ability to generate cash flows because of the issue of loans to the 
families that would not have to be repaid if the associated business venture is 
unsuccessful (Bhaumik and Gregoriou , 2009).  
 
Another case of misleading financial reporting was that of Lippo Group, which 
published two different financial reports to the public and to Badan Pengawas Pasar 
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Modal (BAPEPAM) in 2002, although the firm had an independent board of directors 
and audit committee. In the first financial report, the Lippo Group claimed a net profit 
of Rp 98 billion. A month later, the group had to release a second financial report, 
telling the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) that the earlier report was all a mistake and 
that they had, in fact, posted a loss of Rp 1.27 trillion. BAPEPAM imposed an 
administrative sanction on the board of directors over misleading statements in the first 
financial report (Guerin, 2003). 
 
In 2010, BAPEPAM levied its heaviest sanctions on three firms owned by the Bakrie 
Group - the holding firm PT Bakrie and Brothers Tbk, its subsidiary PT Bakrie Sumatra 
Plantations Tbk and its affiliated unit, PT Energi Mega Persada Tbk and an unaffiliated 
oil and gas firm PT Benakat Petroleum Energy Tbk for publishing false information on 
the amount of their deposits at a local bank (Guerin, 2003). 
 
The penalties were given because the firms failed to meet deadlines to provide 
documentation to clarify the status of their deposits. This finding was identified by the 
Indonesian Stock Exchange. The statements reported that the Bakrie firms had Rp 9.05 
trillion (about US$1 billion) invested in time deposits at Bank Capital. However, the 
bank’s first quarter financial reports indicated that its total deposit was only Rp 2.69 
trillion, of which Rp 2.17 trillion was in time deposits. Thus, there was a seven trillion 
rupiah discrepancy between these reports (Simanjuntak, 2010). 
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The restatement of financial reports by Lippo and the mistakes of financial reporting by 
Bakrie Group were caused by the managers’ opportunistic behavior using unacceptable 
methods, estimates or other intentional errors that influenced the earnings statement 
(Callen, Livnat and Segal, 2005). The Accounting Principles Board (APB), 1971, 
Opinion No. 20, states that restatement involves the changes in accounting principles 
and accounting errors. The situations which change in accounting principles are: 
changes in inventory valuation methods; changes in the method of accounting for long-
term construction-type contracts; changes to or from the full-cost method of accounting 
in the extractive industries; issuance of financial statements by a company for the first 
time to obtain additional equity capital, to effect a business combination or to register 
securities. The restatement is caused by accounting errors involving mathematical 
mistakes, oversights, changes from accounting principles that are not in accordance 
with Generally Accepted Accounting principles (GAAP) and changes in estimates not 
prepared in good faith, misuse of facts as well as misclassifications. 
 
Accounting restatements lead to lower earnings quality because the restatement affects 
the past time series of earnings, downward revisions in future expected earnings. Thus, 
firm value tends to decrease simply because the expected stream of future cash flows is 
lower (Callen et al., 2005). 
 
A  common aspect characterizing the main scandals  is  the  relevance and reliability of 
a firm’s reporting failure, as  shown  by  the willingness  of the firm’s managers  to 
divert firm funds to private uses and make the restatement of financial reporting. This 
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causes investors’ confidence in the quality of  corporate  financial  reporting  to be 
seriously damaged (Tiscini and Donato, 2006). 
 
The financial reporting scandals occurred because companies do not abide by the 
Indonesian rules, such as accounting standards, company law and the Code of Good 
Corporate Governance. The Indonesia’s accounting standards called Pernyataan 
Standard Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK) adopted the International Accounting Standards. 
These rules were released by the Accounting Standards Committee of the Indonesian 
Institute of Accountants in 1994. The company law No 40/2007 was issued by the 
government in 2007. This company law replaced the Company Law No 1/1995 which 
was translated from the Dutch commercial laws. The Code of Good Corporate 
Governance was released by the National Committee on Corporate Governance 
(NCCG) in 1999, completed in March 2000 and revised in 2006. This code is guidance 
for companies in running a transparent, responsible, accountable and fair business 
(Chariri, 2009). 
 
In Indonesia, although there are regulatory bodies, they are not able to ensure the 
quality of financial reporting because the law enforcement is weak (Asian Development 
Bank, 2002). The weak law enforcement allowed some companies to make and use 
their own systems, which often ignore the principles of corporate governance and 
ethics. It can be said that the commitment to quality financial reporting and regulatory 
compliance is determined by the companies themselves in their own cultural ethics 
(Chariri, 2009). 
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The above discussions attest that in Indonesia, there are some financial scandals 
involving family firms. This happens because of weak law enforcement and firms could 
prepare the financial statements based on their own culture and ethics. The quality of 
the financial statement becomes inadequate to help investors to make decision. 
Managers could mislead investors about the underlying strength of the company with 
opportunistic earnings manipulation. For Indonesian investors, knowledge of relevance 
of earnings quality and reliable information is needed.  Relevant earnings show that 
earnings are asymmetric timeliness of loss recognition commitment to timely reporting 
of low realizations that leads to full disclosure of information. It could increase the 
precision of accounting information to assess the firms’ futures. Reliable quality 
earnings emphasize on the reducing of measurement error by the magnitude of 
estimation error in accruals. The accrual earnings could provide information on the 
returns. Therefore, this study develops a link between earnings quality and investors’ 
decision of buying and selling Indonesian family firms’ stock. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
The research questions for this study are: 
1. Is investor’s decision to buy Indonesian family firms’ stocks positively associated 
with relevant earnings quality? 
2. Is investor’s decision to sell Indonesian family firms’ stocks positively associated 
with irrelevant earnings quality? 
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3. Is investor’s decision to buy Indonesian family firms’ stocks positively associated 
with reliable earnings quality? 
4. Is investor’s decision to sell Indonesian family firms’ stocks positively associated 
with unreliable earnings quality? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives 
 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. To study the influence of relevant earnings quality on the  investors’ decision to buy 
Indonesian family firms’ stocks.  
2. To study the influence of reliable earnings quality on the investors’ decision to buy 
Indonesian family firms’ stocks. 
3. To study the influence of relevant earnings quality on the  investors’ decision to sell 
Indonesian family firms’ stocks.  
4. To study the influence of reliable earnings quality on the  investors’ decision to sell 
Indonesian family firms’ stocks. 
 
1.6 Contribution of study 
 
This study provides empirical evidence about the usefulness of earnings quality for 
investors’ decision-making. The results from this study would improve investors’ 
decision-making process, especially for the uninformed investors. The usefulness of 
earnings quality for investors’ decision-making will make managers aware of a number 
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of factors related to earnings quality. These factors may affect investors' perception of 
the quality of earnings. Managers must also consider the trade-off between 
improvements in reported earnings and a possible negative perception of earnings 
quality if the improvements in earnings are perceived to have resulted in lower earnings 
quality. Managers should be held accountable for making an assertion about the firm's 
quality of earnings. Higher disclosure about earnings quality could reduce the costs of 
processing the firms’ specific public information. Therefore, higher disclosure about 
earnings quality will induce more trading in the firms’ stocks by uninformed investors. 
 
1.7 Outline of the Remaining Chapters 
 
The remaining chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the institutional 
setting in Indonesia, focusing on the Indonesian capital market, firms’ rules and 
regulation as well as Indonesian family firms. Chapter 3 summarises the relevant past 
researches on earnings quality and investor decision-making. The main hypotheses are 
developed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the research methods. The result and 
discussion of findings are described in chapter 6. In chapter 7, the conclusions and the 
limitations and suggestions for future research are mentioned. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND OF FAMILY OWNED FIRMS IN INDONESIA, 
INDONESIA CAPITAL MARKET AND LEGISLATION 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains about Indonesia’s institutional setting. Section 2.2 discusses the 
background of family owned firms in Indonesia. Section 2.3 discusses the development 
of the Indonesian Capital Market while the Indonesian rules and regulations are 
discussed in section 2.4, and Summary in section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Background of Family Owned Firms in Indonesia 
Indonesian firms’ ownership are classified family firms, and non family firms.  The non 
family firms include foreign-controlled firms, State Owned Enterprise, widely held 
firms and financial institution-controlled firms (Darmadi and Gunawan, 2013). 
 
2.2.1 Indonesian Family Owned Firms 
 
Family firm is defined as a business that is owned and or managed (controlled) by one 
or more family members (Handler ,1989). Indonesia has the largest number of 
companies controlled by a single family (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 1999). 
These family firms contribute greatly to the Gross National Product (GNP). According 
to Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia or the Indonesian Central Agency on Statistics 
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(2011), the family firms contribute to the formation of 53.28 percent of GNP. In terms of 
capitalization, the top family controls 16.6 percent of total market capitalization while 
the top 15 families control 61.7 percent of the market (Husnan, 2001). This was 
confirmed in the Claessens et al. (1999) study, which showed that in 1996, two thirds 
(67.1 percent) of Indonesian publicly listed companies were in family hands, and only 
0.6 percent widely held. These figures suggested that Indonesian companies had highly 
concentrated ownership structures, particularly in the form of family ownership. 
 
In Indonesia, around 80 percent of large companies have business groups dominated by 
families (Susanto, 2005). Indonesian business groups (conglomerates) range widely in 
size, scope, importance, nature and degree of political connections. Some business 
group leaders were cronies of the Suharto
2
 regime, corruptly receiving very valuable 
special economic benefits and privileges, such as borrowing beyond the legal limits of 
their affiliated banks. Suharto stimulated some of these business groups because they 
could be useful in the development of the country, as well as for private and political 
reasons. Some were closely connected to Suharto himself, such as Bob Hasan,
3
 who had 
                                                 
2
Suharto (1921-2008) was an army officer and political leader who was president of Indonesia from 1967 
to 1998. Suharto and Liem Sioe Liong's first major money-makers were the giant Bogasari flour mills in 
Jakarta and Surabaya, set up in 1971-1972). The lucrative west Indonesian market, which consumed 80 
percent of the flour, became Bogasari's monopoly. 32 years in power, the Suharto’s family controlled at 
least 20 foundations with own stakes in numerous large firms, including cement factories, fertiliser 
factories, toll roads, timber concessions, oil palm plantations and many others. 
 
3
Bob Hasan (born 1931) is an Indonesian businessman and friend of former president of Indonesia, 
Suharto. After Suharto took the presidency in 1966, he initiated a massive expansion of Indonesian 
commercial logging, especially in the islands outside of Java. In 1981 Hasan was a major stockholder in 
the timber firm, Georgia Pacific's Indonesia. Starting from timber, he expanded his business interests into 
financial, insurance, automotive and other industries, primarily through his Kalimanis holding company. 
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large timber concessions and Liem SioeLiong,
4
 whose Salim Group became the largest 
diversified group in Indonesia (Patrick, 2001).  
 
Other family business groups built their fortunes on local products, such as the tobacco-
based Sampoerna and Gudang Garam groups and yet others manufactured in 
partnership with foreign firms, such as the Astra automotive firm. Other groups 
exploited Indonesia’s rich resources or its rich land, such as the Raja Garuda Mas and 
Sinar Mas groups, active in wood, palm oil and other interests. Two large groups were 
led by Suharto’s children, namely Tommy Suharto’s5Humpuss Group and Bambang 
Trihadmojo’s6 Bimantara Group. Of the 20 most prominent business groups in the late 
1990s, a large majority only emerged in the Suharto era (Dieleman, 2008). In 1996, 
family business groups controlled 61.1 percent of all publicly listed companies, while 
other families controlled another 5.4 percent. The Suharto family was the largest group; 
                                                 
4
LiemSioeLiong (born in 1916)  was a Chinese Indonesian businessman He was the head of the 
conglomerate Salim Group .The Salim Group is Indonesia's biggest conglomerate with assets including 
Indofood Sukses Makmur, the world's largest instant noodle producer, and Bogasari, a large flour-milling 
operation. The Salim Group also owns major oil palm plantations, logging concessions and has been 
involved in Property Development and Leisure Industry for around 30years. The businesses include hotel 
and resort development, golf courses, real estates, commercial buildings, shopping centers and industrial 
estates. 
5
Tommy Suharto (born in 1962) is the youngest son of Suharto, the former President of Indonesia. Under 
the banner of the Humpuss Conglomerate, Tommy holds significant stock in an estimated  90 of 
companies. His wide-ranging business interests stretch throughout Indonesia to the United States, to New 
Zealand and Nigeria. Their activities range from oil exploration to natural gas, pharmaceuticals, 
construction and shipping. 
 
6
Bambang Trihatmodjo ( born in 1953) second son of Indonesian President Suharto, is the major 
stockholder of Bimantara group. The Bimantara group companies are concentrated in a number of core 
business groups, notably entertainment, telecommunications, infrastructure, finance, autos and 
electronics. The company also has tie-ups with high-profile multinationals such as Hyundai, Ford, Nestlé, 
Union Carbide and NEC. 
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it alone controlled 16.6 percent of the stock market total capitalization. The top five 
families controlled 40.7 percent, the top ten families 57.7 percent. 
 
The Asian crisis hit Indonesia business groups, both member companies and banks, 
particularly hard since they had relied so extensively on unhedged foreign loans. The 
extreme Rupiah depreciation alone increased corporate liabilities so much as to make 
them virtually insolvent. These balance sheet problems were exacerbated by business 
groups’ heavy reliance overall on debts in addition to equity finance, notably domestic 
loans from banks under group control. Their bank portfolios were excessively 
concentrated in loans to group members. A domino effect was in operation; the failure 
of one company led rapidly to failure of both of the member banks and other member 
companies. The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) came to obtain control 
over so many corporate assets which had been put up as collateral. The consequence 
was bankrupt or insolvent companies and banks and debts far greater in some cases than 
the value of the assets the IBRA took over. The gap had to be covered by the 
government (Patrick, 2001). 
 
Ten years after the Asian Crisis, it was clear that most of the large groups survived and 
were again growing. Despite considerable difficulties in the aftermath of the Asian 
Crisis, most business groups have re-organised their trimmed empires and are putting 
together fresh business deals (Dieleman, 2008).  In the present day, nine Indonesian 
business groups at least tripled their wealth since last year. The country now has 12 
billionaires with a combined wealth of $28 billion, up from seven billionaires, including 
21 
 
Low Tuck Kwong
7
, a coal tycoon of Bayan Resources; whose stock was up 474 percent 
in the past year. Another coal billionaire is Aburizal Bakrie
8
, whose holding is in Bumi 
Resources. Sandiaga Uno
9
 and Edwin Soeryadjaya
10
 make their debut this year in a coal 
company Adaro Energy. Kusnan and Rusdi
11
 hold their budget carrier, Lion Air.  Budi 
and Michael Hartono
12
 hold in tobacco and the banking sector (Nam, 2009). 
                                                 
7
Low Tuck Kwong was born in Singapore in 1949, worked for his father’s construction company in his 
twenties. He then moved to Indonesia in 1972 seeking better prospects. He bought Bayan Resources in 
1997, five years after becoming an Indonesian citizen. Today, the group owns and operates seven mines 
in East Kalimantan, one in South Kalimantan and owns rights to almost 500 million tons of coal deposits. 
 
8
Aburizal Bakrie was born in 1946. In 1972 he joined PT Bakrie & Brothers Tbk - the conglomerate 
founded by his father Ahmad Bakri - which had prospered during the Soeharto regime. The Bakrie Group 
conducts business in agriculture, real estate, trade, shipping, banking, insurance, media, manufacturing, 
construction and mining. In this group, Bumi Resources is the country’s largest and most aggressive 
player in the coal mining sector.  
9
Sandiaga Uno, (born in 1969) is one of Indonesia's richest men with estimated net worth of US $795 
million. In 1994, he joined MP Group Holding Limited as an investment manager. In 1995, he moved to 
NTI Resources Ltd in Canada and worked as Executive Vice President in the company. Unfortunately, 
the monetary crisis in 1997 hit NTI Resources Ltd hard and caused it to go into administration and left 
Sandi unemployed. This prompted Sandi to return to Indonesia. Seeing no real future as an employee, he 
decided to set up and run his own business. In 1997, he founded PT Recapital Advisors and in 1998, he 
co-founded Saratoga Capital with Edwin Soeryadjaya. Twelve years later, Saratoga Capital  was one of 
Indonesia's largest investment firms employing more than 20,000 people. Saratoga Capital, holds most in 
coal miner Adaro Energy. 
 
10
 Edwin Suryadijaja (born in 1949), son of a former billionaire who founded automotive group Astra , is 
a shareholder in PT Adaro Indonesia. Adaro’s first exploration contract was signed in 1982 and in 1991 
the company began production with concessions in South Kalimantan. Today Adaro is the second largest 
thermal coal miner in Indonesia. 
 
11
Rusdi and Kusnanare two brothers. After13 years of experience in the travel business, they determined 
to make their dreams of owning a business flight come true. Equipped with high ambition and initial 
capital of US $10 million, they established Lion Air in October1999, but the operation started running in 
June 30,2000. Lion Air, is Indonesia’s largest private carrier and Asia’s first hybrid carrier which offers 
both economy and business-class seating, based in Jakarta, Indonesia. Lion Air also flies to Singapore, 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Its main base is Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta. It 
operates scheduled passenger services on an extensive network from Jakarta to 56 destinations. 
 
12
Budi Hartono (born in 1940) and Michael Hartono (born in 1939) are two brothers, inherited clove 
cigarette maker Djarum from their father. They also have palm oil interests as they picked up 65,000 
hectares of land in West Kalimantan in 2008. Together they also own Grand Indonesia, a luxury shopping 
mall, office buildings and hotel complex in the centre of Jakarta. 
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In 2012, sixty percent of the twenty five biggest companies in Indonesia were family 
firms. The Astra company, owned by the Soeryadjaya family, is the biggest company in 
Indonesia with revenues of 188 trillion Rupiahs.  The full list of the 25 Biggest 
Indonesian companies is presented in Table 2.1. 
 
As the biggest companies, family firms could reduce unemployment (See figure 2.1). 80 
percent of family firms have more than 150 employees, 16 percent had 100-150 
employees, 2 percent had between 51-99 employees and 19-50 employees (Susanto, 
2005). 
 
Indonesia’s family firms run businesses in various fields and sectors.  More family 
firms run businesses in sectors such as commerce and distribution, professional service, 
transportation, printing and publication as well as manufacturing (Susanto, 2005). 
Figure 2.2 shows an overview of the proportion of family firms in all categories. 
 
Survey by Koh, Tong, and Waltermann (2012) showed that family businesses in 
Indonesia have long been a key pillar of the Indonesian economy. Collectively, family 
businesses account for about 40 percent of the market capitalization of the top 125 listed 
companies in Indonesia and dominate key industries including real estate, agriculture, 
energy, and consumer goods. Industry breakdown by ownership can be seen in Table 
2.2 and Figure 2.3. 
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Table 2.1 Indonesian Biggest Companies (in 2013) 
Company Ownership Revenue 
(in trillion Rupiahs) 
Astra International 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia 
HM Sampoerna 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
Bank Mandiri 
United Tractor 
Indofood Sukses Makmur 
Gudang Garam 
Bumi Resources 
Bank Central Asia 
Adaro energy 
Garuda Indonesia 
Bank Negara Indonesia 
Smart 
Unilever Indonesia 
Perusahaan Gas Negara 
Bank Danamon Indonesia 
Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper 
Sumber Alfaria Trijaya 
Indo Tambangraya Megah 
Indosat 
AKR Corporindo 
Indofood CBO Sukses Makmur 
Barito Pacific 
Chandra Asri Petrocehmical 
Family 
State 
Family 
State 
State 
Widely held 
Family 
Family 
Family 
Family 
Family 
State 
State 
Widely held 
Widely held 
State 
Family 
Family 
Family 
Family 
Widely held 
Family 
Family 
Family 
Family 
188  
77.1  
66.6  
58  
56.9  
55.9  
50  
49  
35.4  
35.2  
34.9  
32.6  
31.2  
27.5  
27.3  
24.2  
23.9  
23.6  
23.4  
22.9  
22.4  
21.7  
21.6  
21.5  
21.4  
 
Source: Fortune  Indonesia Magazine, special edition  July 2013 
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Figure 2.1 Number of Employees in Family Firms 
 
Source: Susanto A.B, 2005 
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